This document, prepared by the UK’s military liaison office, is primarily a set of recommendations for strengthening the Palestinian Security Forces. One annex is a list of projects and goals – everything from training an IT staff to procuring weapons – but few of the goals contain any details about funding or progress. The recommendations contain quotes about the extent of the PSF’s collaboration with Israel, and about the UK’s role in determining the makeup of the PSF. Examples:

(Quotes from document)

“A subtle approach reaps real dividends when dealing with the current NSF commanders and managing change will be all-important. For example,  there may be advantages in keeping the “old guard” in positions of authority whilst decisions are made regarding new structures. Steered towards an option that is workable and fits the equipment that is on offer they will take it. In this way, key decisions can be imposed on them without upsetting sensibilities. With subtle timing, once the decisions are made and the new structures are emerging the “old guard” can be retired with honour. A new command structure can then begin working, with a system in place that Palestinian commanders have planned, directed and thus endorsed.”

“At present the Israeli view is that the deployment is not proactive or sufficiently determined in that the NSF is not arresting the perpetrators of the rocket and mortar attacks or looking to seek out and destroy the manufacturing capability. Second, the Israelis will not permit any enhancements to the NSF that might be diverted for use against Israeli interests, for example munitions and surveillance equipment. Thus important progress in enhancing the NSF capability is not yet possible in some areas.”